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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 930659-CA 
vs. 
Priority 15 
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING, : 
Oral Argument Requested 
Defendant-Appellee. : 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining Mr. Welling's 
income for purposes of child support. The determination of whether 
the trial court exercised its discretion based on mistaken view of 
the law is reviewed de novo by this court. Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 
113 0, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The underlying support award is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Woodward v. Woodward, 70 9 P.2d 
393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
determining that Ms. Welling had need of attorneys' fees and in 
granting an award of those fees? The award is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P. 2d 836 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are determinative of 
this Appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(2) "Income from earned income 
sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time job." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 "Every father shall support his 
child; and every man shall support his wife when she is in need." 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1) "In any action filed under Title 
30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an order of 
custody, visitation, child support, alimony or division of property 
in a domestic case, the Court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorneys fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of 
the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend 
the action. The order may include provision for costs of the 
action." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an Appeal from an Order 
modifying a Divorce Decree and awarding Child Support in an 
increased amount. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Wendell and 
Christy Welling were divorced on October 24, 1984. (R. at 75.) 
Ms. Welling petitioned to modify the Decree of Divorce by document 
dated December 24, 1991 and filed December 31, 1991. (R. at 92.) 
Mr. Welling filed an Answer to the Petition and a Counter-Petition 
on January 28, 1992. (R. at 111.) Trial in this matter was held 
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The Transcript which the Trial Court provided to Appellate 
Counsel was not numbered in accordance with Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 11(b) . For ease of reference, Ms. Welling will refer to 
[. j'jes in the Transcript by their original page numbers. 
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require him to submit hours or compute a total amount of time he 
spends in work-related activities. (Tr. at 40.) 
Mr. Shamo also testified regarding Mr. Welling's work habits. 
He was "very confident in his abilities." (Tr. at 41.) Mr. Welling 
has always been a "top performer" in Mr. Shamo's Division. (Tr. at 
47.) Mr. Shamo further agreed that Mr. Welling was a "remarkable 
salesman" and declared that he "sets the standard for my Division 
as far as work ethic." (Id.) When asked whether he expected Mr. 
Welling to continue his working at his current rate for another ten 
years, he stated that he believed Mr. Welling would be able to keep 
pace. (Tr. at 51.) Finally, Mr. Shamo admitted that he did not 
know whether Mr. Welling's future earnings would increase, decrease 
or stay the same. (Tr. at 53.) 
Evidence regarding Mr. Welling's salary history and 
present income came directly from Mr. Welling. During 1990, he 
received a gross salary of $65,127.78. (Tr. at 68.) In 1991 he 
received $72,478.09. (Id.) Mr. Welling further testified that as 
of November 5, 1992, he had received $95,000.00 in salary and that 
he expected to make approximately $116,000.00 for the entire year. 
(Tr. at 69.) Prior to his employment at Ethicon, Mr. Welling 
worked for Lever Brothers as a Sales Representative managing a 
territory. (Tr. at 72.) During his employment with Lever 
Brothers, which began in 1985, he was paid a base salary and a 
"bonus." (Tr. at 72-73.) He worked approximately the same hours 
at that job as he worked for Ethicon at the time of trial. (Tr. at 
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hroughout his brief, Mr. Welling makes much of "accepting 
new responsibilities" in order to "maintain a new family." {See 
App. Br. at 4, 8, and 12.) This assertion is not supported by the 
record. In fact,. Mr. Welling himself testified that he had worked 
previous jobs which required the same qeneral hours as the one he 
held at the time of trial. (Tr. at 7*. These jobs were held as 
early as 1985, several years before Mr. Welling remarried (Mr. 
Welling was divorced in 1984 and remarried in 1990) . (Tr. at 72.) 
There was no credible testimony that Mr. Welling accepted his 
present employment as a result of his re-marriage. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The usual and customary definition of the statutory phrase 
"full-time" is sufficiently broad to encompass the non-traditional 
work patterns of salesmen, attorneys, doctors and other 
professionals who regularly work extended hours. The legislative 
history indicates the term "forty hours" were deleted from the 
final measure, a decision which supports a broad construction of 
the statute. Mr. Welling's historical work pattern has not changed 
significantly since 1985 and he received nearly $116,000.00 in 
salary for the year 1992. Child support was awarded based upon a 
three year average of $84,000.00. Such an outcome is not an abuse 
of discretion. The standard of living enjoyed during the marriage 
would limit alimony calculations, but is not relevant to child 
support determinations. 
Mr. Welling has failed to marshal the evidence in support 
of the Trial Court's finding regarding Ms. Welling's need for 
attorneys' fees. That failure is fatal to his appellate claim. 
Further, the Court did, in fact, make findings with regard to 
attorney's fees, and those findings are adequately supported by 
substantial evidence in the record. The Court was within its 
discretion to determine that she stood in need of an attorneys' fee 
award. The Court properly disregarded a lump-sum payment of child 
support from its consideration of Ms. Welling's need because the 
payment was made subsequent to the time of trial. In addition, 
child support payments are not a proper source from which to 
6 
extract attorneys1 tees. FJ lid 1.1 y, MM: o 
attorneys' fees on appeal as a prevailing party. 
ARGUMENT 
POi! I'l Il 
A REASONABLE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
Trial cour" ieterminations of income tor purposes of child 
i ... i „ i.'ini 11,mi,II ,H. i U t a h . i i i n c o m e 
r r c m e a r n e d :. - - •_* -• •• . ,rn..^^„ \ .,•- .^ mivalent* r»f nnp 
fui-L-Lirr^  - '~ u Code A^n . S7R 4-V ' - pnrase '! .11-
time -in n 
subsequent court :r. erpietat ion or r.he- .^. -*^-r Despj^e i m ^ 
revi' v - 'Tie iccoia in this ~r'--^ *- -rdicates t-hat 4"h^ statute . ~ 
sufficiently clear on these facts ' [ » ^J1-1" itJeqiidi e -Inert iun ' 
the triai * JC: 
1 , . ^  ^  M. , j UL state* *"* -^r.r-trucfion, courts 
first n1-~ , n.-?anina o,
 : JIIOLLI ;;l .U utor y 
1anguage." Pickett v. Utah Dept, of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 
"Where rA \ a t:i it,oi \ language is plat"! = nd 
unambiguous, rtppexi^te courts cannot look beyond I lie language to 
iiv-ne legisia* : v^ :/;ent, but must construe the statute according 
.Ld,. , .^_, ., J r.zu i^z, ^93 (Utah Ct. 
kpp ; i j ' \ ; ; :,ne * atute creates FUI ' anient- ambiauity to require 
^ r * oons^ru-"1" -r * ne ; ancrua-je i .^  requ.ieo '* jrive effect to 
ley Islatd v' • 1 1 1 1 i • 111 b ::oi irts] 
assume 'the Legislature used each term advisedly . . . .'" State 
v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation 
omitted). Under either a plain meaning determination or under 
standard rules of construction, the trial court's determination to 
award child support based upon an average which was $30,000.00 less 
than Mr. Welling's actual salary was within the court's discretion. 
1. The plain meaning of the term "full-time" is 
sufficiently broad to include non-traditional work patterns. 
Webster's defines the phrase "full-time" as "working or operating 
the customary number of hours in each day, week, or month." 
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 539 (1991). Merriam-Webster 
defines the phrase as "involving or working a full or regular 
schedule." The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 307 (1989). Other 
dictionaries define the phrase as "the length of time considered to 
constitute a complete work, as: a 40-hour work week is considered 
to be full-time." Living Webster Dictionary, 394 (1975). Review 
of various state and federal decisions regarding federal employment 
compensation law and other federal authority yields varying 
definitions. See Words and Phrases, Vol. 17A (Supp. 1993) . In the 
vast majority of definitions, reference is made to the usual or 
normal work pattern involved. 
Consideration of a normal 4 0-hour work week is entirely 
appropriate under a reasonable analysis. See In re Marriage of 
Simpson, 841 P.2d 931, 937 (Cal. 1992) ("Established employment 
norms, such as the standard 40-hour work week, are not controlling 
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but are pertinent to [establishing a reasonable work regimen]."). 
However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase 
"full-time" did not require rigid "40-hour" interpretation under 
the facts presented for review. Mr. Welling himself established at 
trial that his work pattern was normal for the eight other salesmen 
in the division. (Tr. at 37, 50, 56.) The record also indicates 
that Mr. Welling held other employment as early as 1985 which 
required approximately the same time commitment. (Tr. at 73.) At 
the time of trial, he was not paid an hourly rate at Ethicon, his 
hours were not restricted, he did not submit a time sheet of any 
kind, and no records of his hours were kept. (Tr. at 40.) 
This testimony amply demonstrates that Mr. Welling's position 
was "full-time" within the meaning of the statute, that he had 
pursued that particular work schedule for many years, and that 
child support should be based upon an average of his previous three 
years. Since Mr. Welling went to great lengths at trial to 
demonstrate his work ethic and skills as a salesman, (Tr. at 41, 
45, 47, 49, 51), the trial court's determination was not an abuse 
of discretion and should be upheld. 
2. If statutory interpretation is required, the 
legislative history amply supports the suggested construction. 
Common sense and the language of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
7.5(2) dictate that the Legislature did not intend to limit all 
earning activities to the equivalent of one 40-hour work week. 
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Rather, the statute implies a two-fold test which first considers 
what is normal in the industry or career the individual has chosen 
and then weighs the individual's historical work pattern in 
determining an appropriate level of support. 
The language of the statute supports the suggested 
construction. Mr. Welling notes that the term M40-hourn was 
deleted by voice vote on the floor of the Senate. (App. Br. at 
6.)4 Rejection of the phrase clearly indicates the Legislature's 
intent to afford trial courts abundant discretion in determining 
what constitutes a full-time, career position. It is also apparent 
that had the Legislature desired to impose a strict 4 0-hour 
limitation, they would simply have left the language as proposed, 
rather than deleting the phrase "40-hours." It is not necessary to 
torture the final language of the statute to impose an artificial 
child support ceiling when such a limitation could easily have been 
retained with the language of the original draft. 
Rather, this Court may correctly surmise that removal of the 
phrase was intended to enhance a trial court's ability to address 
society's broad range of pay structures which fall outside the 
parameters of a more rigid Legislative test. The unique needs of 
farmers, attorneys, court reporters, salesmen, salaried employees, 
tax preparers, accountants, university staff, physicians and other 
4
 The Court should not consider Counsel's suggestions 
regarding legislative intent, since they are not properly a part of 
the Record. 
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persons who regularly work extended hours are thus more easily met 
without diluting the Legislative norm of a "full-time" salary. 
3. Marital employment levels do not bar subsequent child 
support increases. 
Mr. Welling also urges the Court to limit child support 
calculations to a work pattern "established and expected during the 
marriage." (App. Br. at 7.) The suggested limitation to the 
marriage time frame is more suited to alimony than to child support 
calculations. A clear difference exists between alimony and child 
support. Alimony is an attempt on the court's part to provide 
support for a receiving spouse "sufficient to maintain that spouse 
as nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988). Using 
such a framework, a determination of the standard of living enjoyed 
by the parties during the marriage is appropriate. However, such 
a determination is not called for when addressing child support. 
The suggested standard would transform the parties' income at the 
time of the divorce into a ceiling on child support, making 
increases of any type unattainable. That outcome would not comport 
with the purposes of statutory support obligations enumerated in 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3. Petitions to modify and other procedural 
remedies that increase base calculations would become moot, a 
consequence which cannot have been the intention of the 
Legislature. 
11 
In short, Mr. Welling does not suggest, nor does it appear 
from the Record, that he would consider lowering his work hours or 
reducing his income. He simply wishes to insulate many thousands 
of dollars from child support calculations.5 His proper remedy if 
he chooses to change professions is to request a modification, 
which would be readily available in appropriate circumstances. If 
he continues to work as he always has, and his income increases, 
his natural children should not be denied the benefits of his 
income. 
POINT II 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES. 
Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-3 (1953, as amended) provides for an 
award of attorneys' fees in divorce actions. Utah Courts have 
carefully enumerated three factors to be considered by the Trial 
Court in determining whether attorneys' fees are appropriate: 
1. The receiving spouse must have a financial need for 
the attorneys' fees, 
2. The other spouse must have a financial ability to 
pay and, 
3. The award must be reasonable in light of the work 
actually performed. 
5
 The Court properly pointed out that if Mr. Welling's 
income were to lower by $3 0,000.00 in 1993, he would still not be 
paying child support in excess of the guidelines. (Tr. at 97.) 
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Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bell v. 
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "Both the decision 
to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court." Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 
836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Welling challenges only the 
first element considered by Utah Courts. 
1. Mr. Welling has failed to properly marshal the 
evidence. 
Mr. Welling argues that the Trial Court failed to address 
Ms. Welling's need. (App. Br. at 11.) He further asserts that her 
receipt of an arrearage of child support payments should have been 
considered in determining whether Ms. Welling was capable of 
providing her own attorneys' fees. Jd. Neither of these arguments 
is supported by the record, nor has Mr. Welling properly marshaled 
the evidence in support of the Court's finding. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a strict 
requirement that where Findings of Fact are challenged, an 
appellant must marshal all evidence which supports the trial court 
before an appellate court will consider the challenge. 
To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. 
[Citations omitted.] [Appellant] has not begun 
to carry that heavy burden. Nowhere does he 
marshal the evidence supporting his version of 
the facts, much less the evidence supporting 
13 
the trial court's findings. Under these 
circumstances, we decline to further consider 
[Appellant's] attack on the factual findings. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, 
the appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and 
proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case. 
Saunder v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . This requirement 
applies specifically in divorce matters and more particularly to 
child support calculations. 
To mount a successful challenge to the trial 
court's finding with respect to the child 
support calculation, [Appellant] is required to 
marshal all the evidence supporting the court's 
finding and demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient to support that finding. 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . As noted 
below, the court made specific findings of fact with regard to 
attorneys' fees and considerable evidence supporting those findings 
appears in the record. Mr. Welling's failure to marshal the 
evidence in support of those findings provides an avenue through 
which this court may presume the lower court's determination to be 
correct, and proceed to consider the other issues raised on appeal. 
2. The record fully supports the Trial Court's Award. 
Consideration of the Record on Appeal also yields ample 
grounds for affirming the Trial Court's attorney's fee award. Mr. 
Welling does not refer to the language of the actual Findings of 
14 
Fact with regard to attorneys' fees. The Court specifically 
stated: 
The court finds that the Defendant's attorney's 
fees are approximately One Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($1,000.00), and the Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees are Two Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($2,000.00). The Plaintiff earns 
eighty-seven percent (87%) of the parties' 
combined gross incomes, and therefore should 
pay (87%) of the attorney's fees incurred in 
prosecuting this action, and therefore, 
Defendant is granted a judgment against the 
Plaintiff of $590.00 for attorney's fees. 
(R. at 211.) The Court further noted: 
The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed, and 
the Court finds that she is capable of earning 
$1,075.00 for purposes of computing child 
support. 
(R. at 210.) These findings, when considered in light of the 
evidence presented at trial, adequately demonstrate the Court's 
consideration of Ms. Welling's need. 
A proper marshaling indicates that Ms. Welling was 
unemployed at the time of the modification and that her imputed 
income was a mere 13% of the total income of the parties. (Tr. at 
66-67, 99.) Ms. Welling testified that she had a tumor during a 
period between the divorce and Petition to Modify, that she had 
surgery the following year, and that she was pregnant during some 
portion of that time. (Tr. at 59-60.) She attended Weber State 
University during the years in question and remained occupied 
raising three children. (Tr. at 59-60, 67.) At the time of trial, 
Ms. Welling had incurred debts of Fifteen Thousand Dollars 
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($15,000.00) for college and living expenses. (Tr. at 60.) She 
stated she did not have the ability to pay her attorneys' fees. 
(Tr. at 62.) In fact, she testified that she had "paid $700.00 so 
far [in attorneys7 fees] and it's come out of our everyday living. 
We had to cut back on everything just to be able to come up with 
that money." (Tr. at 62.) This testimony was substantially 
undisputed, and clearly demonstrated Ms. Welling7s need. 
In addition, the only evidence produced at trial that Ms. 
Welling had other resources from which she could pay attorneys7 
fees consisted of passing mention of $1200.00 which Ms. Welling 
received in 1989, child support received for a child by another 
marriage and an undisclosed amount of education grant money. (Tr. 
at 64, 66.) In exercising its discretion, the court could properly 
disregard these items, particularly in light of Mr. Welling7s 
average monthly income of nearly $10,000.00, from which he only 
paid $300.00 per month in total child support. (Tr. at 88.)6 Since 
6
 The trial court noted the inequity of the child support 
order which was in place at the time of trial: 
"The Court: And yet you've been making $65,000.00 now for three 
years and you've still been paying $300.00 a month child support. 
The Court: Well, regardless, that's what you have been averaging? 
When you received $5,500.00 a month are you telling me that you've 
thought for the past three years that $300.00 is a reasonable 
figure to provide for your two children when your income was 
$5,400.00? 
[Mr. Welling] : No, if I was receiving the money, that much a 
month, that's not what I would have sent. 
The Court: Well, in fact, this year you have receiving almost 
$10,000.00 a month; have you not? 
[Mr. Welling]: Averaged. 
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no abuse of discretion has been shown, this Court should uphold the 
Trial Court's Findings and award of attorneys' fees. 
3. Child support payments are not an appropriate source 
of attorneys' fees. 
Appellant next asserts that Ms. Welling's receipt of an 
arrearage payment owed on back-due child support provides money 
from which attorneys' fees should have been paid. This circular 
argument does not merit serious consideration. It is well-settled 
that Findings of Fact are based on evidence adduced at trial and 
Appellate courts do not consider post-trial determinations or 
changes, absent a new legal proceeding. Courts simply do not 
consider post-trial evidence on appeal. See, Low v. Bonacci, 788 
P. 2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990) . "With respect to the new evidence 
offered in Bonacci's brief, we do not consider new evidence on 
appeal") . The suggested funds had not been obtained at the time of 
trial and were not contemplated when the court received evidence. 
They cannot and should not be considered here. 
Alternatively, were the Court to consider Mr. Welling's 
suggestion that a post-trial child support arrearage payment should 
limit Ms. Welling's attorneys' fee award, the suggested outcome 
The Court: And at $10,000.00 a month you've continued only at 
$300.00 for child support; does that seem fair and equitable to 
you? 
[Mr. Welling] : No. That's why I understood there was going to be 
an increase." 
(Tr. at 87, 88.) 
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would fail any reasonable test of equity. The theory would 
circumvent the stated and self-evident uses to which child support 
monies should be devoted. Child support payments support children. 
They are not intended to finance extended disputes between parents 
from which the children would derive little or no benefit.7 As 
noted above, Ms. Welling convincingly demonstrated her urgent need 
for attorneys' fees at trial, and even had the court considered the 
back child support, the award would still have been amply 
justified. The attorneys' fee award should be upheld. 
4 . Ms. Welling is entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal. 
Ms. Welling is also entitled to attorneys' fees on Appeal. 
"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to the party 
who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal." Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (quoting Bert v. Bert, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). If the Court determines that Ms. Welling has substantially 
prevailed on Appeal, the matter should be remanded to the Trial 
Court for determination of a reasonable fee and award thereof. 
7
 This interpretation would also create loopholes through 
which to dilute child support obligations. For example, as in this 
case, a delinquent father would be allowed to make a strategic lump 
sum payment at an advantageous moment, thus avoiding or diminishing 
a later award of attorneys fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Appellee requests that the Court uphold the 
Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Trial Court, award costs, 
interest and attorneys' fees on Appeal, remand for determination of 
a reasonable attorneys' fee, and grant any other relief which the 
Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 19th day of April, 
DA\ 
KING & KI1 
Attorneys xfor Defendant-Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 19th 
day of April, 1994, to: 
Lyle W. Hillyard, Esquire 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 EasW400 
Salt Lake City, 
DAVI 
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A D D E N D U M 
E X H I B I T A 
Determinative Provisions 
78-45-3- Duty of man. 
Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his wife 
when she is in need. 
30-3-3. Award of costs, a t torney and witness fees — Tem-
pora ry alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other 
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order 
may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support, 
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs 
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed 
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or 
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to 
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support 
and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the 
other party. 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or 
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order 
or judgment. 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7.5 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of 
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the 
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
1989, ch. 214, § 6. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
t rus t income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Train-
ing Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assis-
tance; and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly in-
come. 
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earn-
ings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each par-
ent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of 
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of 
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources 
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained 
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer 
statements and income tax returns. 
aa^ 
78-45-7.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work his-
tory, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of 
similar backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount .of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estab-
lish basic job skills; or 
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent 's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right, such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obliga-
tion of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered 
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last 
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection 
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a 
ANALYSIS 
Modification of award. 
Cited. 
Modification of award. 
When the parties had agreed to the amount 
of child support before the effective date of the 
child support guidelines, the trial court erred 
in modifying child support when no petition to 
modify had been filed and in modifying the 
parent, the income shall be based" for "Income 
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made 
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214 
became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
support amount without finding that a mate-
rial change of circumstances had occurred 
since the previous order had been entered. 
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990 
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on 
existing support orders). 
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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E X H I B I T B 
Order and Judgment (including Findings of Fact) 
Lyle W. Hillyard #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING, 
Defendant, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 842022686 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on 
Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce before the 
Honorable Judge Gordon J* Low in the above-entitled court on the 
2nd day of December, 1992, at 9 o'clock a.m. Defendant was 
personally present and represented by Jean Robert Babilis of Jean 
Robert Babilis & Associates and the Plaintiff was personally 
present and represented by Lyle W. Hillyard of Hillyard, Anderson 
& Olsen. The Judge having heard testimony taken, the Court does 
make and enter the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded 
one-half, or five (5) weeks, of the children's summer vacation. 
The court eliminates the first and last week of summer, which 
leaves ten (10) weeks to be divided equally between the parties. ^A^QL^G 
CZP 2i993 
fkk 
The same formula applies to Christmas and other major holidays* 
In addition, the court finds that due to the great geographical 
distance between the parties, the Plaintiff should be awarded 
visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant 
reasonable notice of no less than two weeks where possible, when 
he is in town. The parties should generally follow the 
recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached 
visitation guidelines. 
2. the court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the 
use of her pre-marital surname, to-wit: MORRIS, 
3. The court finds that the Plaintiff provided the 
Defendant with a 1988 .Oldsmobile in exchange for the right to 
claim the parties1 two children as dependents for tax purposes 
for the years through 1990 through 1995. 
4. The court finds that the Plaintiff's income has averaged 
$84,000.00 over the past three years, and therefore, that is the 
figure to be used when calculating child support for the parties1 
two minor children. The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed, and 
the court finds that she is capable of earning $1,075.00 for 
purposes of computing child support. The court finds that the 
Plaintiff has remarried, has a child born as issue of his current 
marriage, and incurs work-related day care expenses. 
5. The court finds that the Defendant should be granted a 
judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven 
Hundred Eleven Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00) for child support 
arrearages from February 1, 1992 through and including the month 
2 
of December, 1992, which represents the amount above and beyond 
the original child support order of $300-00 per month, which has 
been made by the Plaintiff. 
6. The court finds that the Defendant's attorney's fees are 
approximately One Thousand Dollars and no/100 ($1,000.00), and 
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees are Two Thousand Dollars and 
no/100 ($2,000.00). The Plaintiff earns eighty seven percent 
(87%) of the parties' combined gross incomes, and therefore 
should pay (87%) of the attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting 
this action, and therefore, Defendant is granted a judgment 
against the Plaintiff of $590.00 for attorney's fees. 
Based on the above and foregoing, and for good cause 
appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Decree of Divorce entered October 24, 1984, may be modified as 
follows: 
1. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half, or five (5) weeks, of 
the children's summer vacation. The Plaintiff is awarded 
visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant 
reasonable notice of at least two weeks where possible of when he 
will be in town. The parties should generally follow the 
recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached 
visitation guidelines. 
2. The Defendant is awarded the use of her pre-marital 
surname, to-wit: MORRIS. 
3. The Plaintiff is awarded the right to claim the parties' 
two children as dependents for tax purposes for the years through 
3 
1990 through 1995 in exchange for a 1988 Oldsmobile. Thereafter, 
the tax dependency of the children shall belong to the Defendant. 
The Plaintiff may have the option to buy the exemptions, so long 
as he is current and timely in his child support payments each 
year, by paying to the Defendant the tax loss by not being able 
to claim the children on her and her future husband's tax returns 
each year. The parties are ordered to exchange tax returns and 
indicate their incomes and work histories. 
4. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support in the sum 
of Five Hundred Dollars and 50/100 ($500.50) per month per child, 
or One Thousand One Dollar and no/100 ($1,001.00) per month, 
beginning with the month of February, 1992. Said child support 
is due one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each 
month, and shall terminate when each child turns eighteen (18) 
years of age or graduate with their regular high school class, 
whichever occurs last. 
5. The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven 
Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00), minus Four Thousand One Hundred 
Seventy Dollars and ho/100 ($4,170.00) which he paid in December, 
1992, as and for child support arrearages from February 1, 1992, 
to and including the month of December, 1992, which represents 
the amount above and beyond the original child support order of 
$300.00 per month, for a total judgment of Three Thousand Five 
Hundred Forty One Dollars and no/100 ($3,541.00). 
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6. The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the 
Plaintiff in the amount of Five Hundred Ninety Dollars and no/100 
($590.00) as and for a contribution toward Defendant's attorney's 
fees and costs in bringing this action. 
7. All prior orders of this court not modified herein shall 
remain in full force and effect. 
Dated this $ day of^^0krf 1993. 
BY THE COURTS 
D'RDON j / LOW 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's 
attorney, Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 
300, Ogden, Utah 84403, this day of August, 1993. 
Secretary 
c:\lwh\pl\welling.ord 
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E X H I B I T C 
Order 
Lyle W.-, iillyard #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 842022686 
BASED on the Court's Memorandum Decision dated the 6th day 
of August, 1993, it is hereby Ordered: 
1. That Exhibit A of Defendant's Petition be modified as 
shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit D and be submitted to the Court for 
signature, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to this order 
and by this signing shall become entered by the court as its 
order in the December 2, 1992, hearing. 
2. That Defendant's request for additional attorneys fees 
and costs is denied and Plaintiff's request that attorneys fees 
be abated is also denied. 
3. That Defendant's request for a wage assignment is 
denied. ^ 
Dated this ^ day of * ^ ^ « t ; 1993. 
BY THE COl 
re: 
• 7 — r 
± 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge .. ttfdOo'SjlbPfc 
\JLi' 21993 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's attorney, 
Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 300, 
Ogden, Utah 84403, this f3 day of August, 19^-
Secretary V / 
E X H I B I T C 
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Order 
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
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postage prepaid, this 2i5th day of April, 1994, to: 
Lyle W. Hillyard, Esquire 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
175 East 1st North 
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Clerk of the Court 
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